Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace

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Power sharing is often purported to lead to civil peace, though its effects are disputed. We identify three types of power sharing—inclusive, dispersive, and constraining—and analyze their mechanisms of power allocation. We argue that constraining arrangements, which limit the power of a party or social group, are most likely to protect vulnerable groups. Constraining power-sharing institutions, such as guarantees of civil liberties and independent judiciaries to protect them, create checks against governmental repression of minority groups and ordinary citizens, whereas other types of power sharing focus on political elites. Constraining power-sharing institutions limit incentives for mass mobilization and raise the costs of conflict, thus reducing the probability of civil war. Drawing on a new global data set, we examine the effects of power sharing on the onset and recurrence of civil war. In contrast to prior findings, our results show that only constraining power-sharing institutions have a pacific effect.

Civil conflicts have become the most common form of state-centered armed conflict, resulting in millions of deaths among both combatants and noncombatants. Scholars have increasingly turned their attention to better understanding why civil conflicts begin and how they can end (Cederman et al. 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre et al. 2001; Steinberg and Saideman 2008; Walter 1997). To address armed conflict in societies at risk, a common recommendation is to include competing factions in institutionalized power-sharing arrangements (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Mattes and Savun 2009; Roeder 2005; Sisk 1996; Walter 2002; Wucherpfennig 2013). The hope is that, ex ante, each faction will see the payoff from peaceful cooperation as superior to the expected returns from violence and that, ex post, the rewards from cooperative behavior will sustain this expectation (Mattes and Savun 2009; Walter 2002). Proponents of power sharing argue that it activates mechanisms that allow parties to credibly commit to a bargain, thus reducing conflict. Given its promise to minimize the risk of conflict, power sharing has found widespread favor among analysts and peace makers. As we will show, however, such support should be more conditional.

One of the most important challenges in peace building is making commitments to civil peace more credible. Commitment problems are especially relevant to civil war settlements because parties that do not control the national government are often asked to give up their arms and hence their ability to protect themselves against future violence (Fearon 2004; Walter 1997). This vulnerability makes it especially difficult for more powerful actors to make credible commitments to a peaceful order (Fortna 2003; Powell 2006). Can power-sharing institutions alleviate this problem? Research on civil war consistently finds that "the quality of country governance or institutions" affects the likelihood of civil wars (Fearon 2011a, 3; Walter 2011). We argue that certain power-sharing institutions can reduce the risk of civil conflict by increasing the cost of repression and armed violence, thus making commitments to civil peace more credible.
Not all forms of power-sharing institutions serve this purpose. Some power-sharing arrangements may not constrain governments from repression that exacerbates social divisions or exploits the weaknesses of vulnerable groups. Such repression may in turn create grievances that raise social tension and make the targets of repression more willing recruits for insurgents. It is therefore critical to specify the power-sharing institutions that most significantly constrain governments from abusing less powerful groups and individuals, making ordinary citizens less willing recruits for potential insurgents, solving the commitment problem, and making conflict less likely. Institutions such as independent judiciaries and the protection of religious freedom, for example, have been shown to reduce repression (Hill and Jones 2014; Keith 2002; Lupu 2013; Powell and Staton 2009), yet the power-sharing literature has not sufficiently accounted for these effects.

This article provides and tests a theory that identifies the power-sharing institutions most likely to reduce the risk of the onset or recurrence of civil conflict. We make four contributions. First, we identify the mechanisms by which power-sharing institutions allocate power among key actors. Our focus is on the mechanism of protection, which can raise the costs to the government of repressing ordinary citizens. The key to this contribution is our focus on the need to protect ordinary citizens, rather than merely opposition elites, in order to address the government’s commitment problem. Our second contribution is that we explain which type of power sharing is most likely to provide protection, thus alleviating the commitment problem. This argument has important implications not only for our understanding of power-sharing institutions but more broadly with respect to the causes of civil war and the relationship between institutions and conflict. Our argument focuses on constraining power-sharing institutions that limit the power of the dominant party or social group and thus protect ordinary citizens and vulnerable groups against encroachment and abuse. Many existing definitions of power sharing omit these institutions. We explain how constraining power-sharing institutions alleviate commitment problems, thus reducing actors’ abilities to renege on bargains, repress their opponents, and foment conflict. In so doing, we provide a much-needed link between the literatures on repression and power sharing.

Third, we note that extant studies have asked whether power-sharing institutions affect the recurrence of armed conflict in post-conflict societies, and that many have confined their samples to states that have experienced prior civil conflict. Yet even governments of states that have not previously experienced a civil conflict have incentives to repress ordinary citizens in order to remain in power. Such repression can deepen societal cleavages and generate grievances, leading to future civil conflicts. Without institutional constraints, governments of non-post-conflict states may not be able to credibly commit to refraining from repression, creating a similar commitment problem to that faced by governments of states emerging from civil conflict. If certain institutions can reduce the risk of conflict recurrence, they might also reduce the risk of conflict onset in the first place. By drawing on the new inclusion, dispersion, and constraints (IDC) data set, which we collected for the purpose of testing our theory, we assess the relationship between multiple forms of power sharing on the occurrence as well as recurrence of civil conflict. Finally, by using factor-analytic techniques to confirm the existence of distinct dimensions of political power sharing, we mitigate some of the measurement problems in existing research. In order to mitigate a potential problem of reverse causality, we create measures of power sharing without regard to prior conflict history.

**CIVIL WARS, COMMITMENT PROBLEMS, AND POWER SHARING**

Commitment problems often contribute to the causes of civil war and make its termination more difficult. Unlike in interstate wars, combatants in civil wars (other than the national government) often do not retain independent, post-conflict armed forces. This significantly increases the difficulty of committing to respect a settlement after the parties have laid down their arms (Lake 2003; Powell 2006; Walter 1997, 2002).

A key concern among combatants is the possibility of repression and other forms of reneging on conflict settlements (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). When governments are threatened by opposition groups, they often respond with repression (Davenport 2007; Moore 2000). A government’s use of repression can lead to popular dissent and civil unrest (Lichbach 1987). The state’s use of repression (one-sided political violence) and the possibility of ensuing civil war (two-sided political violence) are therefore closely linked (Besley and Persson 2009).

Civil war settlements that include power-sharing arrangements are often argued to alleviate the commitment problem (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007). Power-sharing provisions constrain actors’ ability to renege and thereby decrease the sense of insecurity (Mattes and Savun 2009). Because opposition groups may fear that the government will renege,
power-sharing “provisions are intended to ensure domestic groups that they will not become victims of discrimination and violence in the new state” (Mattes and Savun 2009, 140). Yet existing definitions and operationalizations of power sharing vary significantly. Walter (2002) introduced the disaggregation of power sharing into political, territorial, and economic forms. Hartzell and Hoddie (2003, 2007) add a category of military power sharing. Jarstad and Nilsson (2008) and Mattes and Savun (2009) use similar indicators but expand the set of cases. Mukherjee (2006) focuses on “political power sharing,” which offers rebel leaders concessions such as government posts and the right to form their own parties. Roeder (2005) takes a different approach by distinguishing between power sharing and power-dividing institutions and arguing that the latter provide better foundations for peace.

Empirical estimates of the effect of power sharing are mixed (Binningsbo 2013). Most find that at least some type of power sharing promotes peace, but scholars disagree as to the (most) effective forms of power sharing and the most favorable conditions (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Jarstad and Nilsson 2008; Mattes and Savun 2009; Mukherjee 2006; Walter 2002; Wucherpenning 2013). Roeder’s (2005) results differ most fundamentally from the others, indicating that power-sharing dyads tend to be more conflict-ridden than others.

While we have learned much from these studies, they have several important limitations. First, power sharing is typically defined by single institutional variables or by an additive index of individual institutions. If only one institution serves as a proxy for all power-sharing arrangements, the variety of such institutions (and the variety of mechanisms by which they operate) is not taken into account. On the other hand, tests employing an additive index of power sharing will likely be biased because this measurement procedure assumes that the different components are mutually independent and that their relative weights can be accurately specified a priori (and are generally equal). To address this problem, we both expand and disaggregate the definition of power sharing.

Second, power-sharing institutions tend to be defined in terms of the type of prior conflict they address, such as conflict over territory or conflict over governance (Hartzell and Hoddie 2003, 2007; Walter 2002). Yet the distinction between territory and government mixes the solution and the problem, such that the competitive stakes (territorial autonomy or governmental authority) are subsumed within the definition of power-sharing institutions. We use measures of power sharing that are not coded based on prior (or future) conflicts.

The third limitation in existing research is the focus on post-conflict states. Most existing studies examine power sharing strictly as a strategy for resolving an existing conflict and preventing it from recurring, which is often appropriate depending on the research question. Yet it is no less important to examine whether power sharing can prevent civil conflict from occurring in the first place. Previously, data on power-sharing institutions were not available for societies that had not gone through prior conflict. Our new data set includes all polities, regardless of whether power-sharing institutions were created before or after civil conflict.

Fourth, existing work focuses largely on elites. Political elites are actors that can organize violence, either through the state or through a rebel organization. Opposition elites engaged in organizing armed civil conflict have goals that, broadly speaking, tend to break down into two types: to control the political center of a state or to control a noncentral part of the state (which may entail a demand for political independence). After opposition elites lay down their arms, it may be difficult for the government to credibly commit to abiding by the terms of the peace settlement. Most analyses of the commitment problem in the civil war context focus on the government and elites. Yet opposition elites cannot engage in civil war without some public support. The effectiveness of power-sharing institutions depends on whether they create credible commitments to protect the interests of both elites and publics. We address this limitation by broadening the definition of power sharing to include institutions that facilitate the sharing of power between the government and ordinary citizens and by explaining how such institutions can resolve the commitment problem.

**A Theory of Power Sharing, Protection, and Peace**

In this section, we argue that a specific type of power sharing, which we refer to as constraining power sharing, allows governments to make more credible commitments to peace. This reduces the likelihood of conflict. We begin by discussing the key mechanism that links power-sharing institutions to peace: the protection of ordinary individuals from government repression. We then discuss the key mechanism that can link power-sharing institutions to peace: the protection of ordinary individuals from government repression. We then turn to defining the different types of power-sharing institutions and conclude this section by explaining how constraining power-sharing institutions activate the protection mechanism and alleviate the commitment problem.

While opposition elites often initiate armed conflict against the government, they depend critically on masses for recruits (Gates 2002) and for support more generally (Mukherjee 2006). A rich research tradition has therefore explored patterns of mass public participation in civil conflicts (e.g., Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Opposition elites who might challenge the
government via armed conflict face many costs. In some situations, the costs of fighting are too large or elites lack the capacity to mobilize enough support for combat. If the public they seek to recruit views armed violence as too risky, it may withhold its support, in turn making war too costly for the elites. Potential parties to war will avoid “the ex post inefficiency of war” and instead “prefer to conclude an ex ante negotiated agreement” (Mattes and Savun 2009, 739). To the extent the government can credibly commit to protecting the masses, opposition elites may therefore find it too costly to engage in conflict, even if they perceive some benefits to challenging the state. Institutions that can sever the link between opposition elites and ordinary citizens by raising the cost of mobilizing support for a conflict can therefore make commitments to peace more credible.

The mechanism of protection
Governments regularly use repression to weaken potential challengers, raise their cost of mobilization, and reduce their resources (Davenport 2007). Repressive tactics include civil liberties violations, arrests, torture, and killings. Ordinary citizens, especially those who belong to vulnerable groups, seek credible commitments from the government to protect them against such abuses of power. In states with a history of conflict, governments may find it especially difficult to commit to refraining from such repression against factions disempowered by conflict settlements. Such factions have likely been repressed in some way in the past, causing the grievances that sowed the seeds for the prior conflict. Yet this commitment problem can be just as salient in states without histories of armed conflict, which nonetheless contain groups that are disempowered or otherwise excluded from the governing coalition. Governments have powerful incentives to use repressive force against such groups in order to attempt to retain power, and many governments choose to use such force (Davenport 2007). Given these incentives, committing to refraining from using such force against weak or minority factions can be difficult. How does the protection mechanism alleviate the government’s commitment problem and reduce conflict? To the extent political institutions can prevent the government from using repressive tactics, such institutions activate the protection mechanism. Protection works to the extent institutions increase the government’s cost of repressing ordinary citizens, thus making credible the government’s commitment to refrain from such activities. In turn, this has effects on both publics and opposition elites.

When the government can credibly commit to refraining from repression, this increases the value of the status quo to ordinary citizens. Individuals have diminished incentives to fight to change the status quo and become less likely to mobilize to support opposition elites. Political institutions that can protect the general public from repression and guarantee political access elevate the extent to which ordinary citizens value maintaining the peace. Such systems offer a wider range of choices of political contestation, providing nonviolent forms of resolving disputes with the state, which are generally less costly for citizens than violent conflict (Findley and Young 2011, 363; Tilly 2003). North, Summerhill, and Weingast (2000, 7) point out that “establishing credible commitments requires the creation of political institutions that alter the incentives of political officials so that it becomes in their interest to protect relevant citizen rights.”

Opposition elites may nonetheless have incentives to go to war, yet their ability to do so will be diminished because recruiting supporters will be more costly. This is a bit like the 60’s slogan—“what if they had a war and no one came?” These heightened costs, in turn, increase insurgent leaders’ incentive to engage in political rather than military competition. If the cost of fighting is sufficiently large because the public will not mobilize, political violence will not be effective no matter how war-prone elites are.

In a post-conflict society, the effects of the protection mechanism can be thought of as a credible commitment to protecting individuals who are associated (ethnically, geographically, or otherwise) with the faction that gave up its arms in the conflict termination arrangement. If and to the extent the government can credibly commit to protecting such individuals from repression, they will be less likely to take up arms again, even if the elites in their faction urge them to do so. In other societies, however, this mechanism can be just as important: when the government can credibly commit to refraining from repressing existing or potential opposition groups, the types of grievances that lead to armed conflicts will be less likely to arise in the first place.

The forms of power sharing
Which type of power-sharing institution can activate the protection mechanism? Because much of the literature focuses on elites, power sharing tends to be defined in terms of institutions that facilitate the sharing of power among elites. Our definition of power sharing is broader, aiming also to encompass institutions by which the government shares power with broader publics. We thus define political power sharing as an arrangement that mandates or facilitates the participation of a broad set of decision makers in the policy process.

Power sharing comes in three distinct forms, which differ fundamentally with respect to what it means to “share.” One form of sharing is evident when political activists demand that elites “share the wealth.” In such contexts the meaning of “sharing” relates to a call for limitations on a
dominant actor or group. Second, dispersing a good proportionally to different individuals is also a form of sharing, as for example when family members share an inheritance. In this context, the meaning of sharing is quite different. It takes place with the dispersion of goods, which are to be consumed separately by their respective recipients. Another common notion of power sharing implies inclusiveness or jointness in participation. This is the type of sharing in which individuals experience something together and jointly, like sharing a house or a memorable occasion. Thus, sharing can refer to restrictions on some group’s control of the good in question, the dispersion and individual consumption of a good, or joint and inclusive consumption.

Following these three different meanings of “sharing,” the manner in which power is shared politically can thus be divided broadly into three different forms. “Constraining” arrangements limit the power of political office holders, and thereby serve to protect vulnerable groups, individuals, and civil society more broadly against encroachment and abuse. “Dispersive” institutions distribute authority among groups or regions in a well-defined pattern (e.g., federalism). “Inclusive” arrangements mandate that the representatives of designated parties or groups hold particular offices or participate in particular decision-making processes. In some cases, these types of power-sharing arrangements are part of post-conflict settlements, such as in Burundi and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In many cases, however, similar institutions have been established and/or evolved through other processes, including liberalization and democratization, such as federalism in Switzerland, judicial review in the United States, and Fiji’s system of reserved legislative seats.

**How constraining power-sharing institutions activate the protection mechanism**

While other types of power sharing focus on the sharing of executive and legislative power, in constraining arrangements those branches of government share power with the judiciary, civil society, and ordinary citizens. In order to gain social peace and legitimacy, governments often agree to constrain themselves by creating institutions that credibly prevent them from abusing their power (Fearon 2011b; North and Weingast 1989). Constraining power-sharing arrangements aim to safeguard human rights and emphasize the protection of vulnerable groups or individuals from abuses of power. By doing so, constraining power-sharing institutions can activate the protection mechanism.

Many institutional forms associated with liberal democracy might be conceived of as constraints on the government, but our focus in this article is not on all the possible forms of institutional constraints on government power. Our definition of constraining power-sharing institutions focuses more narrowly on those institutions that are relevant to the sharing of rights between the political elites in government and minorities and ordinary citizens in the public. A key constraining power-sharing institution is the freedom of religion, under which the state can neither sanction nor proscribe religious practices, thus allowing minority religious groups to practice their faith. Another key constraining power-sharing institution that helps enforce such rights is an effective judicial check on the authority of elected officials, whereby, for example, the high court has the power of judicial review and judges have lifelong tenure. Constraining power sharing can also help deter the capture and abuse of government coercive capacity for factional purposes. Because the armed forces are in many societies the organization most capable of such capture and abuse, bans on military officers serving in the legislature can thus constrain such forces and prevent abuses.

Table 1 provides examples of constraining, dispersive, and inclusive power-sharing institutions. A full list of these institutions can be found in appendix B (all appendixes available online). Based on the IDC data, table 1 also provides examples of polities that feature each type of power-sharing institution.

Constraining power-sharing institutions are effective at preventing civil conflict because they activate the protection mechanism. Such institutions limit the abuse of power, which in turn limits patterns of exclusion and discrimination. These are commitments to protect the rights of minorities who do not control the central executive. The direct effects of constraining power-sharing institutions are felt by the public, securing their rights, increasing the value of the status quo, and lowering their interest in change. Such institutions drive down the incentives to bear the costs/risks of fighting. Political institutions that guarantee a variety of avenues for nonviolent political expression and protect against political repression thus provide credible commitments to civil peace. The link between constraining power-sharing institutions and civil peace comes from both the expectation and the fulfillment of respect for minority and individual rights. Although elites may still wish to take up arms to improve their respective lots, they will find it more costly to win support from publics whose rights are better protected.

A key constraining power-sharing institution, the establishment of the right to religious freedom limits the ability of

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2. Our definition of constraining power sharing thus excludes constraints such as legislative veto powers and other forms of horizontal accountability (O’Donnell 1998; Tsebelis 2002), which are important but outside the scope of our argument.
elites to shape policy around their religious practices or preferences and thus protects those with other views. Many civil conflicts are fought over identity issues, a big part of which is often religion. According to Toft (2007, 42), religious civil wars were fought between 1940 and 2000. When a regime imposes laws that discriminate against rival religious groups, such groups begin to fear for their faith (Philpott 2007). Conflicts can also result from elites socially constructing identities around religious cleavages and mobilizing oppressed groups to produce new conflicts. As Toft (2007) argues, “When political elites come under immediate threat, they will work to reframe issues of contention as religious issues, essentially attempting to outbid each other in an effort to establish religious credibility and thus attract domestic and external support” (97–98). Protections for the freedom of religion can help prevent these scenarios. Groups that are not being religiously repressed will be less likely to mobilize behind elites that attempt to foment conflict based on their religious identity. This will increase the cost of conflict to elites, thus making war less likely.

Another constraining power-sharing institution that can credibly protect minority rights from government abuse is an independent judiciary. If and to the extent the judicial branch can effectively and independently review and overturn government actions that violate legal agreements, it can also sustain the government’s promises to refrain from abusing its citizens. “Namely, if an independent judiciary exists, extremists can be less concerned about a strong crackdown by the government in the future” (Findley and Young 2011, 374). Leaders of states with independent courts are significantly less likely to be able to abuse the human rights of their people (Hill and Jones 2014; Keith 2002; Lupu 2013; Powell and Staton 2009). Not all judiciaries have such independence; the extent to which a judiciary is truly a constraining power-sharing institution depends on factors such as the processes for judicial appointment, the power of judicial review, and the rules governing judicial tenure.

The Constitutional Court of Benin, created following the adoption of the state’s constitution in 1990, demonstrates how this type of institution activates the protection mechanism. The Constitution of Benin provides numerous human rights protections and legally incorporates the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. Individuals have direct access to the court when human rights abuses are alleged, and Article 121 of the Constitution grants the Court the power to act on its own motion to determine the constitutionality of laws and regulations that threaten the fundamental rights of citizens. Since its establishment, the Court has used its powers to find violations of human rights in hundreds of cases. The government’s record with respect to human rights abuses has improved significantly over the same period.

Constraining power-sharing institutions also affect elites. These institutions can protect the rights of minority elites and make them less inclined to engage in armed violence. By activating the protection mechanism, these institutions render potential supporters less likely to mobilize for war, which makes recruitment more costly for the elites. As Humphreys and Weinstein (2008, 436) note, “If [armies] have motivated participation instead by mobilizing popular discontent with government policies, post-conflict arrangements must take more seriously the establishment of institutional arrangements that address discrimination, oppression, and inequality.” This argument leads to the following hypothesis:

**H1.** The probability of civil war is smaller in polities with more constraining power-sharing institutions.

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Why other forms of power sharing do not resolve the commitment problem

Dispersive power sharing. Dispersive power sharing distributes power by decentralizing decisions across regions or sectors of society. Most often, the policy process is divided by giving control of particular territories and processes to particular groups (Brancati 2006). Institutions commonly associated with dispersive arrangements include federal structures, wherein local or autonomous governmental units possess budgetary and policy autonomy.

Dispersive power-sharing arrangements are primarily elite oriented. These institutions grant power and influence to regional elites both within their own region and in national politics (e.g., by granting representation to states/provinces in national legislatures). Such arrangements are often designed to offer opposition elites security and autonomy. Leaders of opposition factions may fear for their personal safety to the extent that they represent a threat to the state, and the state has not made arrangements to safeguard their safety. Such concerns may be especially salient in post-conflict societies because former belligerents are themselves prime targets. The government has an incentive to preemptively attack rebels who have disarmed so that they cannot rearm. Yet even leaders of groups that have never taken up arms may fear for their personal safety because governments may view them as potential threats.

Dispersive power-sharing arrangements may therefore seek to build loyalty by granting opposition elites protection of their persons and property. An example can be found in Nigeria. Campbell (2013, 31) characterizes the Nigerian post-civil war patron-client system of power sharing as based on several rules, such as (1) "no president for life," (2) patrons at the pinnacle are never killed by their rivals, and (3) money accumulated by a political figure in office is sacrosanct. In addition, there are explicit rules about "zoning" or division of the spoils and rotation of political offices (particularly the presidency) between different regions, a form of dispersive power sharing.

Elite co-optation offers a potential adversary sufficient private incentives not to take up arms (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Magaloni 2008). One example of such co-optation is when Revolutionary United Front (RUF) leader Foday Sankoh in Sierra Leone was offered a position within the post-conflict government that granted him control over the diamond trade (Binningsbo and Dupuy 2009). Elite co-optation can but need not occur after a conflict; elites of a rival faction can be brought into a ruling coalition before ever taking up arms. By making participation in the existing government attractive enough, elites may be induced to choose peace rather than war. Over time, co-optation can improve opposition elites' loyalty to the regime (Wintrobe 1998), particularly as co-opted elites become more invested in maintaining the status quo.

Yet opposition elite co-optation and security do not effectively commit the rulers to refrain from abusing weak groups and individuals. Most importantly, because these mechanisms focus on opposition elites, they do not credibly constrain the government from repressing the broader public. And even if some elites are protected or co-opted, the government can still repress others, creating an incentive to shift the focus of repression rather than curtail it. Thus, institutions designed to induce or co-opt elites to agree to peace are vulnerable to the problem of credibly committing not to repress.

A further problem is that factional politicians empowered by a power-sharing arrangement may themselves take up arms against others. The same thing may happen when a factional party is weak at the time a power-sharing arrangement is forged but subsequently becomes more powerful. Moreover, co-optation can create perverse incentives by appearing to reward insurgency and inducing other oppositional politicians to take up arms (or threaten to do so) in hopes of gaining similar advantages for themselves (Roeder 2005; Tull and Mehler 2005). For all of these reasons, concessions to factional leaders may not build peace in the longer term.

Finally, co-optation can lead to repressive substitution by governments. Leaders can co-opt parts of their opposition in order to focus repressive activities on others (Moore 2000). When autocrats are threatened by groups that have been co-opted, they tend to respond with concessions, but when threatened by other groups they tend to respond with repression (Conrad 2011). Insurgents may be able to anticipate this behavior, thus continuing to conspire or rebel, even when they hold formal political office (Magaloni 2008).

Others have argued that regional autonomy may reduce the threat of conflict by appealing to a complicit public (e.g., Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). Government concessions to regional autonomy may undercut a particular group’s support base for armed rebellion. In addition, if dispersive institutions are created in conjunction with credible commitments to prevent repression, dispersive power sharing may work to strengthen civil society. Yet ethnic federalism can also sow the seeds of conflict. While the new province may give a certain identity-group policymaking autonomy, it also may create new minorities, as in the former Yugoslavia. Moreover, the creation of new provinces based on ethnic identity may create perverse incentives for ethno-politicians to organize armed conflict in the hope of further devolution. Such autonomy can increase the risk of future violence unless it takes the form of full partition (Chapman and Roeder 2007). Nigeria and India have each had a history of repeated breakups of existing states, driven by these kinds of incentives. Disper-
Inclusive power sharing. Inclusive power-sharing arrangements grant members shares in the exercise of political power, so that each group or party can contribute to important public decisions. Mutual veto and grand coalitions are key forms of inclusive power sharing. According to Lijphart, the most important institution of this type is the grand coalition (Lijphart 1985). The grand coalition may take different forms, including “a grand coalition cabinet in parliamentary systems, a grand coalition of a president and other top officeholders in presidential systems, and broadly inclusive councils or committees with important advisory and coordinating functions” (Lijphart 1985, 7). Another example of inclusiveness is a set of seats in the national legislature that is reserved for members of a minority group.

Inclusive power-sharing arrangements guarantee policy-making influence and access to power, which activate the mechanism of elite co-optation. Advocates of inclusive arrangements focus on how this form of power sharing makes peace more attractive, by committing the elites of all represented groups in society. Yet inclusive power-sharing institutions often do not create mechanisms that protect ordinary citizens. This may leave them vulnerable to government repression and thus can lead to an unstable peace. Empirical research suggests that such concerns are not unfounded. Regimes with inclusive arrangements are thus more prone than others to use repressive tactics such as torture (Conrad 2014; Frantz and Kendall-Taylor 2014; Vreeland 2008). Although some opposition elites may therefore be well served by inclusive institutions, the broader public can face government repression and hence be more willing to mobilize against the state. This situation can in turn lead to the emergence of new opposition elites who have not been previously co-opted and the recurrence of conflict.

Inclusive arrangements can also result in two other problems. First, inclusive power sharing strengthens ethnic divisions by cementing them to guaranteed positions in government (Horowitz 2003). The hardening of cleavages strengthens factional identities and attachments, thereby making it easier for elites to appeal to norms of group solidarity and kinship (Gates 2002). Second, inclusive power sharing may also raise the risk of conflict because it rewards elites who oppose the state (Tull and Mehler 2005). Once some opposition elites are rewarded through an inclusive power-sharing arrangement, leaders of other groups may see challenging the state as a means to power and influence. Moreover, once those elites who are co-opted receive their rewards, which are often monetary, it may be difficult for the government to prevent them from using these resources to seek the regime’s downfall (Magaloni 2008). And if their rhetoric has been successful, it may be difficult for factional leaders to resist such demands from their constituents. Inclusive power sharing is thus subject to many of the same limitations that plague dispersive power sharing. We therefore expect that neither dispersive nor inclusive power sharing has a positive effect on civil peace.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY

We test our hypothesis using new data, collected specifically for this purpose and in recognition of the research design limitations of previous research. The IDC data set, which is further described below and in Strøm et al. (2016), contains data on 180 countries between 1975 and 2010. Our data precisely date major institutional changes, such as the introduction of new constitutions or the overthrow of regimes. This allows us to create a country-day data set. By precisely dating institutions in place as of a given day (as well as conflict onset and termination), we can establish temporal precedent with a much higher degree of accuracy than is possible with conventional country-year data.4

Dependent variable

Our dependent variable is the onset of an armed intrastate conflict. We use the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Conflict Termination data set (Kreutz 2010), which has information on start and end dates for all UCDP conflicts. The threshold in the UCDP definition of internal conflict is at least 25 deaths from armed violence in a year. Because there is no agreed-upon definition of what it means for a conflict to end, it is often unclear whether two periods of armed violence constitute one or two conflicts. For cases in which violence reemerges, we have relied in our main estimations on an often-used rule that demands a minimum of one year of inactivity before we code renewed violence as a new conflict onset. We use the start and end dates in Kreutz (2010) to measure the time between two distinct episodes of conflict.

Samples

Our theoretical discussion does not distinguish between post-conflict and non–post-conflict societies. Our arguments are intended to apply to both types of societies. We therefore

4. Both our dependent variable (conflict onset) and key independent variables (power sharing) are coded on a country-day basis. Other variables are coded on a country-year basis. For such variables, we include in our analysis the annual values they take on during the date in question (e.g., if the date is January 15, 1978, we use the values of the conflict onset and power-sharing variables for January 15, 1978, and the values for 1978 for all other variables).
include all states in our primary analysis (model 1 below). Because much of the existing literature has focused only on post-conflict societies, however, we will also separately test our arguments in a sample limited to those polities. This subsample (model 2 below) contains only conflict onsets that happen in states that had previously experienced a conflict. We are thus able to contrast the post-conflict sample with a full sample of all countries, so that we can estimate and compare the effects of power-sharing institutions under both conditions.

Statistical model

To analyze the relationship between power-sharing institutions and conflict, we use a conditional logit model (which is described in detail in app. A because of space considerations). The data structure used in this analysis closely follows that of Raknerud and Hegre (1997) and Hegre et al. (2001). We begin with a list of conflict onsets, $w$, and sort them in ascending chronological order. At each point in time when an onset occurs, $t_i$, we take a cross-sectional snapshot of all other independent countries at that time. The dependent variable is binary, where “1” denotes an observation of a conflict that started on that specific day.

Key independent variables

The IDC data set codes 19 indicators of power sharing. These variables were chosen a priori because they represent the key indicators of power sharing, based both on the power-sharing literature and on our theory of the three types of power sharing. Factor analysis confirms that these institutions indeed cluster into three latent factors, as our theory suggests. Our indicators of constraining power sharing are institutions that protect the rights of minority groups and ordinary citizens. These include protections of religious freedom, bars against military engagement in elected politics, bans on explicitly ethnic or religious parties, and the existence of an effective and independent judicial check on the authority of elected officials. These measures are designed to avoid capturing purely horizontal constraints on executive authority, such as legislative veto players and other checks and balances. Our coding of constraining institutions also recognizes that they may not be effective if they exist only on article and are not enforced. We therefore include both de jure and de facto measures of several of our constraints. Our inclusive power-sharing indicators cover two of Lijphart’s components of consociationalism: grand coalitions and mutual veto. They also include the reservation of seats or executive positions for specific minority groups to ensure their inclusion in central-government decision-making. Our indicators of dispersive power sharing are grouped along three dimensions: (1) powers allocated to regional governments; (2) the election of regional governments by regional electorates; (3) the representation of regional constituencies in the central government. A full list of the indicators is provided in appendix B.

The indicators are coded from constitutions, peace treaties, and a variety of secondary sources. Many indicators are based on de jure institutions, but we also include some de facto indicators, particularly those that tell us whether core power-sharing institutions, such as may be included in the national constitution, are actually implemented. The 19 indicators and 3 indexes are described in greater detail in Strom et al. (2016). Strom et al. (2016) also report factor analysis of these 19 indicators, which shows that, as predicted by our theory, they cluster around three latent variables, each of which corresponds to one type of power sharing. Based on the factor loadings, we construct an index measure of each type of power sharing. In these indexes, higher weights are assigned to those indicators that are most closely correlated with other indicators of the same latent variable and, by extension, with the underlying latent variable. We use these index measures in our analysis.

Control variables

It is possible that certain institutions are more likely to be created under specific conditions that, in turn, affect the probability of conflict. There are three aspects to the issue: (a) some factors might explain both the creation of power-sharing institutions and the onset of conflict; (b) when conflict recurrence is analyzed, aspects of the prior conflict may have affected the end of that conflict and the creation of post-conflict institutions (see Chapman and Roeder (2007) and Mattes and Savun (2009) for detailed discussions of this issue); and (c) in models of conflict recurrence, states “select” into the sample by experiencing a prior conflict. Existing work on power sharing and conflict recurrence addresses problems (a) and (b) by controlling for factors that might explain the creation of power-sharing institutions and the onset of conflict, which we include in both models 1 and 2, as well as by controlling for the factors that predict civil war settlement or the end of the prior conflict, which we include in model 2. Nonetheless, by only analyzing post-conflict states, the inference in much existing work is threatened by problem (c). By testing our hypothesis on both post-conflict states and a broader sample of states (many of which did not experience a prior conflict), we go further than existing analyses in addressing problem (c). If we find consistent results regarding the relationship between power sharing and conflict in both models

5. For an excellent discussion of latent-variable-based indexes, see Jackman (2008).
we can better rule out biases resulting from selection into a prior conflict.

**Economic development and population.** We control for the natural log of GDP per capita and the natural log of population. We use data from World Development Indicators (2011), supplemented with data from the Penn World Tables. We control for economic growth using the World Development Indicators, supplemented with data from Gleditsch (2002).

**Electoral democracy.** Democracies are less conflict prone than other states (Hegre et al. 2001) and less likely to abuse the rights of their citizens (Davenport 2007), so publics in these countries may have fewer reasons to take up arms than those in other states. Many measures of democracy, such as Polity, include both institutional and electoral dimensions of democracy. Including such a measure in our analysis would be a problem because these institutional features share some common elements with our power-sharing data. We therefore use the measure of electoral democracy provided by Alvarez et al. (1996), supplemented by the measure provided by Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2013) with respect to cases for which Alvarez et al. (1996) do not provide data.

**Ethnolinguistic fractionalization.** Identity heterogeneity is likely to influence political institutions. Ethnicity may also affect civil conflict, although this point is hotly debated (Cederman et al. 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2003). We control for this using data from Roeder (2005).

**Regime stability.** Regime instability can be detrimental to the effectiveness of power sharing and can foster uncertainty and subsequent conflict. Following Hegre et al. (2001), we operationalize regime instability as temporal proximity to prior regime change, and we operationalize regime change based on the Gates et al. (2006) definition. We use a decay function to account for this because the expected relationship between the effect of a preceding regime change and the risk of conflict is nonlinear (Gates et al. 1996).

**Interregnum.** The IDC data set codes certain polities as experiencing interregnums. These are periods in which it is unclear who is in power, or when a state is temporarily without any government or ruler. Many power-sharing indicators could not be reliably coded with respect to such periods. For these cases, we code each specific power-sharing institution as absent and include an indicator variable indicating the units for which this is the case.

6. The decay function is \( f(t) = 2^{-\alpha t} \), where \( t \) represents the number of days since the previous institutional change and \( \alpha \) represents the half-life parameter. The value of \( \alpha \) tells us how long it takes before the effect of a preceding institutional change on the risk of conflict is halved. We find 12 months to be the optimal half-life parameter for this sample. The measure is equal to one immediately after an institutional change has occurred and approaches zero as the institutional change becomes more temporally distant.

**Additional controls for post-conflict model.** To test our hypothesis for the sub-sample of post-conflict states (model 2), we add several control variables that capture characteristics of the prior conflict. The intensity and duration of the prior conflict may affect both the type of settlement reached to end it and the likelihood of new conflict onsets. We control for these factors using the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict data set (Gleditsch et al. 2002). Third parties, such as other states and the United Nations, often intervene in civil conflicts. These interventions can both shape the course of the conflict and have important effects on the parties’ ability to credibly commit to a settlement (Fortna 2004; Walter 1997). We control for this factor using the UCDP Peace Agreement data set. We control for whether a peace agreement was signed to end the prior conflict, as this could affect both whether new institutions were created and whether the conflict recurs. We also control for whether the agreement included disarmament provisions, as this can exacerbate the commitment problem. For both variables, we use the UCDP Peace Agreement data set (Harbom et al. 2005). Like power-sharing institutions, peacekeeping missions endeavor to alter the incentives of belligerents to promote peace. Peacekeeping can often enhance the credibility of peace agreements through international commitments. Thus, they may serve as either complements to or substitutes for power sharing, and their presence is determined both by international factors and factors specific to the conflict itself. We control for whether a post-conflict peacekeeping mission was instituted using data from Fortna (2008).

**Missing data**

There are some observations in the IDC data set for which information on one or more indicators is missing due to a lack of credible information.7 In our main specification, we impute the missing indicator data using the Amelia 2 program (Honaker, King, and Blackwell 2011) before running the factor analysis. We use the resulting power-sharing indexes in our statistical models. We also include a dummy variable that indicates those units for which at least one underlying indicator was missing.

**RESULTS**

The results are shown in table 2. In both models, the coefficient for constraining power sharing is significant and negative, meaning that these institutions are associated with a lower probability of conflict, as our theory suggests. The results also indicate that the relationship between con-

7. To reduce missing data, coders adhered to a “preponderance of the evidence” rather than a “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard when assigning values to a particular indicator. Nonetheless, for some observations credible information could not be obtained. See Strom et al. (2016).
straining power-sharing institutions and conflict is similar for initial conflict and conflict recurrence. This further indicates that selection into a prior conflict is not likely to explain the relationship we find between constraining power sharing and conflict.

Dispersive power sharing does not have a significant relationship with conflict. Interestingly, inclusive power sharing has a significant positive coefficient in model 1, which indicates that such institutions are associated with a larger probability of initial conflict, rather than a lower probability, as much of the literature would suggest. The result supports the arguments made by Conrad (2014), Horowitz (2003), Magalon (2008), and other authors discussed in the section on inclusive power sharing as to the potential dangers of these

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All States</th>
<th>Post-Conflict States</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constraining power sharing</td>
<td>-0.341***</td>
<td>-0.278***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0846)</td>
<td>(0.104)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersive power sharing</td>
<td>-0.0830</td>
<td>-0.0471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.471)</td>
<td>(0.159)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inclusive power sharing</td>
<td>0.142***</td>
<td>0.0485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0533)</td>
<td>(0.0635)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth</td>
<td>-2.231***</td>
<td>-0.893</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.758)</td>
<td>(0.880)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Electoral democracy</td>
<td>0.0625</td>
<td>-0.0454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.163)</td>
<td>(0.201)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population (logged)</td>
<td>0.414***</td>
<td>0.267***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0408)</td>
<td>(0.0597)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (logged)</td>
<td>-0.461***</td>
<td>-0.341***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.0691)</td>
<td>(0.0877)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Ethnolinguistic fractionalization</td>
<td>0.883***</td>
<td>0.335</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.259)</td>
<td>(0.335)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Temporal proximity to prior change in institutions</td>
<td>0.323</td>
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<td></td>
<td>(0.227)</td>
<td>(0.269)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interregnum</td>
<td>-0.884</td>
<td>-1.731*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.603)</td>
<td>(1.027)</td>
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<td>Missing power-sharing indicator</td>
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<td>-0.432**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.157)</td>
<td>(0.181)</td>
</tr>
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<td>Prior conflict characteristics</td>
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<tr>
<td>Intensity</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(0.280)</td>
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<td>Duration</td>
<td>0.0000644−05***</td>
<td>(0.0000169−05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
<td>(0.341)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Third-party intervention</td>
<td>-0.441</td>
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<tr>
<td>Disarmament</td>
<td>0.206</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peace agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>0.0477</td>
<td>(0.313)</td>
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<td>Observations</td>
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<td>18,793</td>
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<tr>
<td>Log-likelihood</td>
<td>-1,132</td>
<td>-755.9</td>
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Standard errors are in parentheses
*** p < .01.
** p < .05.
* p < .1.
institutions. In model 2, however, the coefficient of inclusive institutions is significantly smaller than in model 1 and is not significant. This indicates that we cannot conclude with confidence that inclusive power sharing affects conflict recurrence, but in either case the effect is smaller than it is with respect to initial conflict.

In model 1, a 1-unit increase in the constraining power-sharing index (e.g., from −1.5 to −0.5 or from 0 to 1) is associated with a 29% reduction in the probability of conflict onset. Examples of states with a value of roughly 0 in the constraining power-sharing index are Czechoslovakia and Romania during most of the 1970s and 1980s, which had minor protections for religious freedom, as well as some judicial powers, but where judges did not have lifelong terms and did not have the power to review legislative and executive decisions. An example of a state with a value of roughly 1 is Botswana during the period 1975–2010, which has explicit prohibitions on state establishment of religion and on restricting religious freedom, as well as lifelong tenure for judges and the power of judicial review. In model 2, an increase in 1 unit in the constraining power-sharing index is associated with a 24% reduction in the probability of conflict onset. Appendix D provides several additional analyses of marginal effects.

“Economic growth” is associated with a lower probability of conflict onset but is not a statistically significant predictor of the recurrence of armed conflict. This is a striking result especially because this variable captures short-term change. Read together, the results suggest that conflict recurrence may be less sensitive to short-term changes in economic conditions than initial onsets, a phenomenon that bears further investigation. “Population” is statistically significant and positively associated with a larger probability of conflict onset and recurrence, as we would expect. “GDP per capita” is negatively associated with conflict onset and recurrence. “Ethnolinguistic fractionalization” is positive and statistically significant in the model that includes all states, which is consistent with the recent literature on the relationship between ethnicity and conflict (Cederman et al. 2011). In the post-conflict model, however, this variable is not statistically significant, and its coefficient is significantly smaller than in model 1. A possible reason for this is that this variable changes relatively little over time. Ethnolinguistic fractionalization may therefore explain the initial onset and thus selection into the post-conflict sample, but because the variable remains stable it may not further explain conflict recurrence.

Interestingly, in model 2, most of the characteristics of the prior conflict are not individually statistically significant (although they are jointly significant). Most of these variables are significant in an alternate model that excludes power-sharing institutions. This implies that, to some extent, prior conflict characteristics affect the choice of post-conflict power-sharing institutions, as we would expect, but that individually they may not affect conflict recurrence once such institutions are put into place. In addition, by controlling for these factors in model 2, we are better able to estimate the extent to which power-sharing institutions affect conflict recurrence independently of the prior conflict characteristics that may have led to such institutions being implemented.

Robustness tests

We estimate a series of additional models to test the robustness of our results. The result of these tests, reported in appendix C, provide strong support for our theory.

Time since conflict. Civil conflicts are often intermittent, recurring after pauses of days, weeks, or months. When the killing stops for a period of time, the conflict could be over or there simply may be a lull in fighting. It can often be difficult to determine whether multiple intermittent periods of violence are part of one conflict or constitute multiple conflicts. The ceasefire of April 2012 in Syria, which lasted hours, clearly did not separate two conflicts. What about the 2002 ceasefire in Sri Lanka, after which the conflict dipped below 25 battle casualties over a calendar year, but resumed again in 2003? We could think of this as two conflicts, but most observers would not. In contrast, the 20 years between the 1946 and the 1966 Kurdish uprisings in Iraq are uncontroversially two distinct conflicts. How much time does it take before we can call a conflict over and hence code renewed conflict between the same parties over the same incompatibility as a new onset? If every lull in fighting is counted as the end of conflict, we would greatly exaggerate the number of conflict terminations. To address this problem more fully, we estimate robustness tests that exclude states with recent recurring conflicts. Rather than set a specific cut-off for what “recent” means (as we did in our main specification), we instead reestimate model 1 for each value of a measure of time since the last conflict, in days. In other words, these models iteratively increase the threshold of conflict recentness and exclude countries from the sample that do not meet that threshold. Thus, our sample size iteratively decreases.

Missing data. As noted above, there are missing values for some of the underlying indicators in the power-sharing indexes. We test the robustness of our results by using an alternative strategy that codes instances of missing data as zeros. When coders did not find evidence of the existence of a political institution, it may be more likely than not that the given institution did not exist.
Measures of electoral democracy. Electoral democracy is one of the most important control variables in our models but also one that is particularly difficult to measure. We test the robustness of our results using alternative operationalizations.

Unit of analysis. Although the country-day unit of analysis allows us to better establish a temporal connection between institutions and conflict, we test the robustness of our results using a more conventional country-year unit of analysis.

Post-conflict indicator. The extent to which states create power-sharing institutions may be affected by whether or not they have previously experienced a civil conflict. We add a variable to the all-states model that indicates whether or not the state previously experienced a civil conflict.

Time since institutional change. One might expect the effects of power-sharing institutions to depend on the length of time during which they have been in place, although the power-sharing literature does not generally emphasize this notion and it is outside the scope of our theory. The “Temporal Proximity to Prior Change in Institutions” variable in our models helps us test whether the institutions’ relationship with conflict is independent of the length of time they have been in place, but does not test whether this relationship changes over such time. To do so, we estimate robustness tests that include interaction terms between the three power-sharing indexes and the “Temporal Proximity” variable. The results of these models continue to demonstrate a significant negative relationship between constraining power-sharing institutions and conflict onset.

Individual constraining power-sharing institutions. Although our theory focuses on the relationship between conflict onset and constraining power-sharing institutions as a set of institutions, our main focus has been on protection from repression offered by religious freedom and independent national judiciaries. As a final set of tests, we replace the constraining power-sharing index with each of these indicators. In the results, each of the individual coefficients of the indicators is negative, but the coefficients for the religious freedom variables are more consistently significant. This provides some evidence, although it is inconclusive, that a key mechanism behind the negative relationship between constraining power-sharing institutions and conflict is the protection of religious freedom.

CONCLUSIONS
Power sharing, particularly as manifest in institutions that protect the rights and security of the population at large, provides a pathway to peace. Constraining power-sharing institutions, in contrast to inclusive and dispersive types of power sharing, embody a credible commitment to peace by providing protection from repression. Mechanisms that serve to co-opt rival elites and guarantee their personal security may work to get fighting parties to sign a peace agreement, but cannot assure a credible commitment to peace over time in environments of changing levels of relative power and military capacity. Inclusive power sharing is inherently elite-focused and does not adequately address this commitment problem. Safeguarding against the monopolization of power, constraining power-sharing institutions work by limiting the government’s ability to repress, which raises the costs of mobilizing a rebel force and creates the conditions for a credible commitment to peace.

Drawing on new data, we have examined the pacific properties of different types of power-sharing institutions both for countries that have previously experienced civil war and for those that have not. Our analysis shows that only constraining power-sharing institutions are significantly associated with a reduced risk of armed civil conflict onset, including the risk of initial conflict and the risk of recurrence in post-conflict environments. Inclusive and dispersive institutions are not significantly associated with peace. Constraining power-sharing institutions are likely pacific because they provide security for ordinary citizens; protection against government repression is a key pathway through which power-sharing leads to peace.

This article suggests several areas for further research. One is to examine in more detail the causal mechanism of protection we have discussed in the paper. Existing work has examined the role of institutions such as independent courts in protecting individuals from repression in individual cases; because of space considerations, we have not engaged in extensive case study analysis in this article regarding the role of protection in linking constraining power-sharing institutions to a reduced risk of civil conflict onset. Such work would certainly enrich our understanding of the causal mechanism and potentially provide a more nuanced understanding of how constraining power-sharing institutions promote peace. A second area we hope to further explore is the extent to which the sequence in which power-sharing institutions are created is related to conflict. It may be the case that certain institutions are more effective if their establishment is preceded by other institutions. Relatedly, interactions between individual institutions may also have important effects. For example, in a federal structure, it may be interesting to analyze whether dispersive power-sharing institutions can affect peace if accompanied by constraining power-sharing institutions within the federal units. Finally, our findings have important implications for our broader understanding of the causes of civil war. Much of the litera-
ture on commitment problems implicitly or explicitly tends to focus on the government’s commitments to opposition elites. Our theory and findings emphasize the importance of the government’s commitment to protect ordinary citizens, suggesting that we can learn more about the causes of civil war by further examining the links between repression and civil conflict.

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