Legislative Veto Players and the Effects of International Human Rights Agreements

Yonatan Lupu

George Washington University

Supplementary Information

A. Matched Sample

This section describes the matched sample used to estimate the models reported in Table 3 of the paper. Table 1 lists the countries included in the matched sample and notes the number of years for which they are included as an ICCPR member and the number of years for which they are included as a ICCPR non-member. Figure 1 shows a map of the country-years included in the matched data set. Countries shaded in darker gray appear in the matched data set in a larger number of years.

Table 1: Country-Years Included in the Matched Sample

| Country	Years as ICCPR Member	Years as Non-Member	Country	Years as ICCPR Member	Years as Non-Member	Country	Years as ICCPR Member	Years as Non-Member
United States	4	11	Moldova	5	1	Seychelles	1	0
Canada	11	0	Romania	8	0	Morocco	12	0
Bahamas	0	25	Russian Federation	6	0	Algeria	5	2
Cuba	0	27	Estonia	1	0	Tunisia	7	0
Haiti	2	10	Latvia	4	0	Libya	17	0
Dominican Republic	10	0	Lithuania	4	0	Sudan	14	2
Jamaica	10	0	Ukraine	4	0	Iran	9	0
Trinidad and Tobago	10	0	Belarus	2	0	Turkey	1	22
Barbados	4	0	Armenia	5	0	Iraq	20	0
Dominica	4	0	Georgia	4	1	Egypt	8	1
Grenada	13	8	Azerbaijan	9	1	Syria	18	0
St. Lucia	0	6	Finland	5	0	Lebanon	12	0
St. Vin. and Gren.	3	0	Sweden	3	0	Jordan	14	0
Antigua and Barbuda	0	6	Norway	4	0	Israel	4	10
St. Kitts and Nevis	0	4	Denmark	3	0	Saudi Arabia	0	12
Mexico	10	0	Iceland	5	0	Yemen	6	0
Belize	4	8	Cape Verde	3	0	Kuwait	8	6
Guatemala	5	10	Sao Tome and P.	0	2	Bahrain	1	17
Honduras	3	16	Guinea-Bissau	0	22	Qatar	0	5
El Salvador	4	0	Equatorial Guinea	18	3	UAE	0	5
Nicaragua	8	0	Gambia	16	0	Oman	0	10
Costa Rica	6	0	Mali	11	0	Afghanistan	16	1
Panama	8	0	Senegal	11	0	Turkmenistan	3	2
Colombia	9	0	Benin	1	3	Tajikistan	1	3
Venezuela	9	0	Mauritania	1	15	Kyrgyzstan	4	0
Guyana	15	0	Niger	5	2	Uzbekistan	7	0
Suriname	14	0	Cte d'Ivoire	4	3	Kazakhstan	1	8
Ecuador	3	0	Guinea	13	0	China	0	22
Peru	7	0	Burkina Faso	2	14	Mongolia	14	0
Brazil	2	11	Liberia	0	20	North Korea	0	3
Bolivia	12	0	Sierra Leone	1	10	South Korea	0	26
Paraguay	2	6	Ghana	2	19	Japan	11	0
Chile	2	0	Togo	7	2	India	9	0
Argentina	0	5	Cameroon	13	1	Bhutan	0	8
Uruguay	7	0	Nigeria	3	9	Pakistan	0	26
United Kingdom	2	0	Gabon	15	1	Bangladesh	2	13
Ireland	3	8	Central African Rep.	14	0	Myanmar	0	15
Netherlands	9	0	Chad	6	7	Sri Lanka	8	0
Belgium	4	2	Congo	15	0	Maldives	1	4
Luxembourg	6	2	D.R. Congo	0	23	Nepal	4	10
France	6	0	Uganda	4	13	Thailand	1	14
Monaco	3	0	Kenya	13	0	Cambodia	4	10
Switzerland	3	11	Tanzania	16	0	Laos	0	25
Spain	2	0	Burundi	6	3	Malaysia	0	25
Andorra	1	3	Rwanda	15	0	Singapore	0	24
Portugal	3	0	Somalia	18	3	Brunei	0	1
Poland	7	0	Djibouti	2	10	Philippines	3	5
Austria	4	0	Ethiopia	1	7	Indonesia	0	19
Hungary	6	0	Eritrea	3	2	Australia	5	0
Czech Republic	3	0	Angola	15	3	Papua New Guinea	0	26
Slovakia	3	0	Mozambique	7	5	New Zealand	9	0
Italy	3	0	Zambia	14	0	Vanuatu	0	4
San Marino	2	0	Zimbabwe	6	1	Solomon Islands	0	22
Malta	2	9	Malawi	0	7	Kiribati	0	3
Albania	5	7	South Africa	1	17	Tuvalu	0	2
Macedonia	3	0	Namibia	3	2	Fiji	0	27
Croatia	6	0	Lesotho	3	8	Tonga	0	6
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5	0	Botswana	4	14	Nauru	0	4
Slovenia	1	0	Swaziland	2	6	Marshall Islands	0	3
Greece	0	16	Madagascar	15	0	Micronesia	0	3
Cyprus	5	0	Comoros	0	21	Samoa	0	4
Bulgaria	6	0	Mauritius	7	0			

Figure 1: Countries included in the matched sample. Countries shaded in darker gray are included in the sample during more years.

B. Robustness Tests

This section sets forth the results of several robustness tests.

Table 2: Robustness Test: ITT data

	(1) Torture of Dissidents
ICCPR Ratification	-0.434*
	(0.217)
Political Constraints	-1.779*
	(0.706)
Political Constraints X ICCPR Ratification	1.916*
	(0.807)
Polity	0.036
	(0.020)
Judicial Independence	0.214
	(0.162)
Regime Durability	-0.007
	(0.003)
Civil War	-0.390
	(0.226)
International War	0.508
	(0.395)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.131
	(0.081)
Population (logged)	-0.105
	(0.075)
INGOs	-0.000
	(0.000)
Torture of Dissidents$_{t-1}$	0.295***
	(0.054)
Treaty Commitment Preferences	-0.750
	(0.474)
Fixed Effects for Year	Yes
n	306

Ordered Probit Model
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 2: Marginal effects of ICCPR ratification at differing values of Political Constraints.

Table 3: Robustness Test: Derogations Removed

	(1) Freedom of Speech	(2) Political Imprisonment
ICCPR Ratification	-0.097	-0.100
	(0.081)	(0.081)
Political Constraints	-0.541*	-0.328
	(0.246)	(0.259)
Political Constraints X ICCPR Ratification	0.964***	0.731*
	(0.269)	(0.286)
Polity	0.071***	0.060***
	(0.007)	(0.008)
Judicial Independence	0.349***	0.247***
	(0.051)	(0.051)
Regime Durability	-0.000	0.003*
	(0.001)	(0.001)
Civil War	-0.139	-0.618***
	(0.081)	(0.095)
International War	-0.044	-0.286
	(0.153)	(0.187)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	-0.004	0.011
	(0.029)	(0.029)
Population (logged)	-0.085***	-0.121***
	(0.026)	(0.028)
INGOs	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rights$_{t-1}$	0.946***	1.037***
	(0.061)	(0.051)
Treaty Commitment Preferences	0.129	-0.255*
	(0.100)	(0.110)
Fixed Effects for Year	Yes	Yes
n	1976	1976

Ordered Probit Models
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 3: Marginal effects of ICCPR ratification at differing values of Political Constraints.

Table 4: Robustness Test: No Countries in which Treaties are Superior to Legislation

	(1) Freedom of Speech	(2) Religious Freedom	(3) Torture	(4) Imprisonment	(5) Disappearances
ICCPR Ratification	-0.143	-0.018	-0.248**	-0.107	-0.160
	(0.084)	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.092)
Political Constraints	-0.622*	-0.040	-0.456	-0.221	-0.058
	(0.254)	(0.274)	(0.267)	(0.267)	(0.311)
Political Constraints X	0.915**	0.696*	0.656*	0.769*	0.347
ICCPR Ratification	(0.280)	(0.308)	(0.287)	(0.304)	(0.331)
Polity	0.085***	0.050***	0.028***	0.068***	-0.001
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.009)
Judicial Independence	0.304***	0.276***	0.157**	0.216***	0.261***
	(0.054)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)	(0.061)
Regime Durability	0.000	0.003	0.003*	0.004**	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Civil War	-0.180*	0.053	-0.639***	-0.648***	-1.026***
	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.096)	(0.096)	(0.088)
International War	0.123	0.077	-0.334	-0.349	-0.041
	(0.158)	(0.169)	(0.230)	(0.223)	(0.166)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.001	-0.065*	0.059*	0.023	0.030
	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.030)	(0.032)	(0.035)
Population (logged)	-0.095***	-0.126***	-0.150***	-0.112***	-0.066*
	(0.028)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.032)
INGOs	0.000	-0.000	0.000	-0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Rights$_{t-1}$	0.906***	1.048***	0.906***	1.079***	0.897***
	(0.062)	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.053)	(0.054)
Treaty Commitment	0.032	-0.263*	-0.240*	-0.160	-0.030
Preferences	(0.106)	(0.115)	(0.105)	(0.116)	(0.121)
Fixed Effects for Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
n	1802	1802	1802	1802	1802

Ordered Probit Models

Robust standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 5: Robustness Test: Convention Against Torture

	(1) Torture
CAT Ratification	-0.315**
	(0.096)
Political Constraints	-0.820**
	(0.268)
Political Constraints X CAT Ratification	0.769**
	(0.297)
Polity	0.028***
	(0.008)
Judicial Independence	0.195**
	(0.064)
Regime Durability	0.001
	(0.002)
Civil War	-0.579***
	(0.102)
International War	0.332
	(0.289)
GDP Per Capita (logged)	0.087**
	(0.031)
Population (logged)	-0.159***
	(0.031)
INGOs	0.000*
	(0.000)
Torture$_{t-1}$	0.929***
	(0.058)
Treaty Commitment Preferences	-0.272**
	(0.105)
Fixed Effects for Year	Yes
n	1576

Ordered Probit Model
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Figure 4: Marginal effects of CAT ratification at differing values of Political Constraints.