

Violence, Non-violence, and the Effects of International Human Rights Law

Supplemental Information

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Please Note: The Supplemental Information is meant for online publication only.

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Appendix A: Survey Instrument

INTRODUCTORY PROMPT – PROVIDED TO ALL RESPONDENTS.

The following questions are about the [Indian/Israeli/Argentine] government's relations with groups that oppose the government. Around the world, some opposition groups like the Scottish National Party or the World Wild Fund for Nature have taken more of a non-violent approach; others like the Irish Republican Army and the Earth Liberation Front have instead used violence. Different governments have, in turn, handled these sorts of groups in different ways. You will read about a situation our country has faced many times in the past and will probably face again. The situation is general, and is not about a specific opposition group in [India/Israel/Argentina] in the news today. We will describe one approach the government has taken, and ask whether you approve or disapprove.

OPPOSITION TACTICS [Non-Violent / Violent]

Non-Violent

An opposition group recently began challenging the [Indian/Israeli/Argentine] government's authority. Members of the opposition group have organized and conducted several peaceful protests and worker strikes.

Violent

An opposition group recently began challenging the [Indian/Israeli/Argentine] government's authority. Members of the opposition group have organized and conducted several violent attacks against civilians and government officials.

GOVERNMENT RESPONSE [Non-Violent / Violent]

Non-Violent

The government responded with significant restrictions on the media, such as newspapers and television stations, imposing curfews that require people to remain in their homes after dark, and restricting the ability of people to travel within and outside the country.

Violent

The government responded by arresting without charge, beating, and torturing suspected members of the opposition group.

INTERNATIONAL LAW [No additional prompt / Treaty prompt]

The control group for this treatment receives no additional prompt, while the treatment group receives the following prompt.

The government's actions violated international law. [The government had previously signed international treaties that do not allow the use of these actions.] [Bracketed text not included in Argentina survey.]

QUESTIONS

Approval

Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the government handled the situation?

- Strongly approve
- Somewhat approve
- Neither approve nor disapprove
- Somewhat disapprove
- Strongly disapprove

Competence

In the scenario we described earlier, how would you describe the government's competence?

- Very competent
- Somewhat competent
- Neither competent nor incompetent
- Somewhat incompetent
- Very incompetent

Security

How much do you think the government's handling of the situation will help or hurt the country's security?

- Help a lot
- Help somewhat
- Neither help nor hurt
- Hurt somewhat
- Hurt a lot

Reputation

How much do you think the government's actions will help or hurt the country's reputation in the world?

- Help a lot
- Help somewhat
- Neither help nor hurt
- Hurt somewhat
- Hurt a lot

Morality [India and Israel only]

Do you think the way the government handled the situation is, or is not, morally acceptable?

- Yes, it is morally acceptable
- No, it is not morally acceptable

Threat [India and Israel only]

How much of a threat do you think the opposition group poses to the government?

- Very threatening
- Somewhat threatening
- Not very threatening
- Not at all threatening
- Don't know

Appendix B: Socio-Demographic Items

	India	Israel	Argentina
Male	1 = Male; 0 = Female.	1 = Male; 0 = Female.	1 = Male; 0 = Female.
Age	1 = 18-24 years; 2 = 25-34 years; 3 = 35-44 years; 4 = 45-54 years; 5 = 55-64 years; 6 = 65 years or older	1 = 18-24 years; 2 = 25-34 years; 3 = 35-44 years; 4 = 45-54 years; 5 = 55-64 years	1 = 18-24 years; 2 = 25-34 years; 3 = 35-44 years; 4 = 45-54 years; 5 = 55-64 years; 6 = 65 or older
Education	1 = Less than high school; 2 = High school; 3 = Some college; 4 = Bachelor's degree or higher.	1 = Less than high school; 2 = High school; 3 = Some college; 4 = Bachelor's degree or higher.	1 = Less than high school; 2 = High school; 3 = Some college; 4 = Bachelor's degree or higher.
Ideology	1 = Extremely Liberal; 2 = Liberal; 3 = Slightly Liberal; 4 = Moderate; 5 = Slightly Conservative; 6 = Conservative; 7 = Extremely Conservative.	1 = Extremely Liberal; 2 = Liberal; 3 = Slightly Liberal; 4 = Moderate; 5 = Slightly Conservative; 6 = Conservative; 7 = Extremely Conservative.	Not included
Political Interest	1 = Not at all interested; 2 = Slightly interested; 3 = Somewhat interested; 4 = Very interested.	1 = Not at all interested; 2 = Slightly interested; 3 = Somewhat interested; 4 = Very interested.	Not included

<p>Activism</p>	<p>1 = Engaged in any of the following activities over the previous 12-month period: attended a protest or rally, contacted a government official, volunteered or worked for a political campaign, donated to a campaign, served on a community board, or worked with others to solve a community problem; 0 = Otherwise.</p>	<p>1 = Engaged in any of the following activities over the previous 12-month period: attended a protest or rally, contacted a government official, volunteered or worked for a political campaign, donated to a campaign, served on a community board, or worked with others to solve a community problem; 0 = Otherwise.</p>	<p>1 = Engaged in any of the following activities over the previous 12-month period: roadblock, strike, work stoppage, march, or public protest; 0 = Otherwise.</p>
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Appendix C: Balance Tables

We conducted balance tests comparing the distribution of background covariates across the relevant experimental groups. Tables 1-3 report results from a series of logit models estimating the effect of various background covariate on the probability of receiving each of the three treatments, which are displayed separately for each country. The results indicate that only one background covariate significantly predicts treatment assignment, i.e., that more educated individuals in Argentina were less likely to receive the opposition violence treatment. Additional balance tests are available from the authors upon request.

Table 1: India: Effect of Background Covariates on Probability of Receiving each Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Opposition Violence	Government Violence	International Law
Age	0.0297 (0.0784)	0.0175 (0.0783)	0.0611 (0.0785)
Male	0.184 (0.155)	0.0947 (0.155)	-0.153 (0.155)
Education	0.0517 (0.137)	0.178 (0.138)	-0.119 (0.137)
Ideology	-0.0242 (0.0480)	-0.0236 (0.0480)	0.0321 (0.0480)
Political Interest	0.0451 (0.0996)	0.108 (0.0997)	-0.128 (0.0998)
Activist	-0.294 (0.168)	-0.0326 (0.167)	0.0930 (0.168)
Constant	-0.259 (0.669)	-1.024 (0.672)	0.638 (0.670)
Observations	795	795	795
Pseudo R-squared	0.00417	0.00331	0.00463

Notes: Logit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$.; *** $p < 0.001$.

Table 2: Israel: Effect of Background Covariates on Probability of Receiving each Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Opposition Violence	Government Violence	International Law
Age	0.00187 (0.0438)	0.0293 (0.0438)	0.00217 (0.0437)
Male	-0.0342 (0.115)	0.184 (0.115)	0.0353 (0.115)
Education	0.0138 (0.0594)	0.0362 (0.0593)	0.0641 (0.0593)
Ideology	0.0374 (0.0392)	-0.0204 (0.0392)	-0.0183 (0.0391)
Political Interest	0.0898 (0.0711)	-0.0875 (0.0710)	0.0510 (0.0709)
Activist	-0.163 (0.119)	-0.0180 (0.119)	-0.0540 (0.119)
Constant	-0.414 (0.309)	0.0459 (0.308)	-0.292 (0.308)
Observations	1,292	1,292	1,292
Pseudo R-squared	0.00208	0.00251	0.00137

Notes: Logit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses.

* p<0.05; ** p<0.01.; ***p<0.001.

Table 3: Argentina: Effect of Background Covariates on Probability of Receiving each Treatment

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Opposition Violence	Government Violence	International Law
Age	-0.0237 (0.0381)	0.00674 (0.0381)	-0.0111 (0.0379)
Male	-0.0947 (0.123)	-0.178 (0.123)	0.0314 (0.122)
Education	-0.222*** (0.0628)	-0.0760 (0.0619)	-0.0614 (0.0617)
Activist	0.203 (0.270)	0.335 (0.273)	-0.0742 (0.267)
Constant	0.486** (0.201)	0.342* (0.200)	0.211 (0.199)
Observations	1086	1086	1086
Pseudo R-squared	0.00865	0.00306	0.000874


Notes: Logit estimation. Standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$.

Appendix D: Survey Samples

This Appendix provides additional information regarding our survey samples. Figure 1 reports the percentage of male respondents in each country. Figures 2, 3, and 4 report the distributions of age groups in the India, Israel, and Argentina samples, respectively. Figures 5 and 6 report the distributions of ideologies in the India and Israel samples, respectively.¹ Figures 7, 8, and 9 report the distributions of education attainment levels in the India, Israel, and Argentina samples, respectively.

Figure 1: Gender Distribution – All Countries



¹While a measure of ideology was included in the Argentina survey, it suffers from a high non-response rate.

Figure 2: India: Age Distribution




Figure 3: Israel: Age Distribution




Figure 4: Argentina: Age Distribution




Figure 5: India: Ideology Distribution




Figure 6: Israel: Ideology Distribution




Figure 7: India: Education Distribution




Figure 8: Israel: Education Distribution





Figure 9: Argentina: Education Distribution



Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics of Results

This Appendix provides descriptive statistics regarding our survey results. Figures 10, 11, and 12 report the distributions of government approval in the India, Israel, and Argentina samples, respectively. Tables 4, 5, and 6 report correlations between approval and the other post-treatment responses in the India, Israel, and Argentina samples, respectively.

Figure 10: India: Approval Distribution




Figure 11: Israel: Approval Distribution




Figure 12: Argentina: Approval Distribution




Table 4: India: Outcome Variable Correlations

	Approval	Security	Competence	Reputation	Morality
Security	0.6312				
Competence	0.6397	0.6225			
Reputation	0.6485	0.6678	0.6046		
Morality	0.6411	0.5667	0.5581	0.5938	
Threat	0.2212	0.1616	0.1943	0.2094	0.1384

Table 5: Israel: Outcome Variable Correlations

	Approval	Security	Competence	Reputation	Morality
Security	0.4666				
Competence	0.6987	0.4922			
Reputation	0.4369	0.4639	0.4843		
Morality	0.6215	0.4189	0.6037	0.4224	
Threat	0.0841	0.1507	0.1097	0.0404	0.0924

Table 6: Argentina: Outcome Variable Correlations

	Approval	Security	Competence
Security	0.6399		
Competence	0.5326	0.6319	
Reputation	0.6176	0.8015	0.6368

Appendix F: OLS Results

Table 7 provides the results of ordinary least squares models of government approval. We include several demographic variables as controls, which vary somewhat based on availability across each of the specific national survey samples. Positive coefficients indicate greater levels of approval for the government. The results of these models are consistent with the difference-of-means tests reported in the main text. Our most consistent result is that opposition violence increases approval of governments. By contrast, government violence only significantly reduced approval of the government in the Argentina sample. Finally, the effect of the international law treatment is negative in India, positive in Israel, and not significant in Argentina.

Table 7: Ordinary Least Squares Models

	India	Israel	Argentina
Opposition Violence	0.081*** (0.021)	0.129*** (0.017)	0.039* (0.019)
Government Violence	-0.009 (0.021)	-0.017 (0.017)	-0.075*** (0.019)
International Law	-0.065** (0.021)	0.033* (0.017)	-0.004 (0.019)
Age	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.001 (0.006)
Male	-0.020 (0.023)	0.010 (0.017)	0.014 (0.020)
Education	-0.082*** (0.020)	-0.049*** (0.009)	-0.022* (0.010)
Ideology	-0.016* (0.007)	0.047*** (0.006)	
Political Interest	0.059*** (0.015)	-0.006 (0.011)	
Activist	0.033 (0.025)	0.022 (0.018)	-0.007 (0.043)
Constant	0.764*** (0.101)	0.309*** (0.048)	0.315*** (0.037)
R^2	0.084	0.120	0.023
N	795	1292	1086

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

We also estimated the same OLS models while excluding the demographic variables. The models reported in Table 8 include only variables indicating the treatment groups. The results are generally consistent with those of the models that include demographic characteristics.

Table 8: Ordinary Least Squares Models

	India	Israel	Argentina
Opposition Violence	0.078*** (0.022)	0.131*** (0.017)	0.041* (0.019)
Government Violence	-0.009 (0.022)	-0.020 (0.017)	-0.075*** (0.019)
International Law	-0.068** (0.022)	0.028 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.019)
Constant	0.580*** (0.022)	0.291*** (0.017)	0.283*** (0.020)
R^2	0.028	0.045	0.018
N	796	1292	1096

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix G: Ordered Probit Results

Table 9 provides the results of ordered probit models of government approval. The results are consistent with the OLS results reported in Appendix F.

Table 9: Ordered Probit Models

	India	Israel	Argentina
Opposition Violence	0.262*** (0.076)	0.461*** (0.060)	0.149* (0.069)
Government Violence	-0.028 (0.075)	-0.056 (0.060)	-0.294*** (0.069)
International Law	-0.241** (0.075)	0.133* (0.060)	-0.018 (0.069)
Age	-0.039 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.023)	0.006 (0.021)
Male	-0.067 (0.082)	0.031 (0.062)	0.061 (0.069)
Education	-0.284*** (0.074)	-0.169*** (0.032)	-0.070* (0.035)
Ideology	-0.063* (0.026)	0.171*** (0.021)	
Political Interest	0.234*** (0.053)	-0.033 (0.038)	
Activist	0.108 (0.088)	0.073 (0.064)	-0.051 (0.155)
pseudo R^2	0.030	0.043	0.010
N	795	1292	1086

Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix H: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

This appendix provides the results of tests for heterogeneous treatment effects. We tested for heterogeneous treatment effects with respect to the treatments for which we found significant results in at least two countries: opposition violence and international law. We tested whether the effects of these treatments were heterogeneous along several demographic variables. Table 10 reports the results of these tests with respect to the opposition violence treatment. Some demographic variables are not available with respect to the Argentina, so Table 10 reports these results as “NA”. Table 11 reports similar results with respect to the international law treatment. Argentina is excluded from Table 11 because the underlying treatment effect was not statistically significant. With respect to both treatments, we did not find any statistically significant heterogeneous treatment effects.

Table 10: Heterogenous Treatment Effects - Opposition Violence

	India	Israel	Argentina
Male	0.015 (0.046)	0.018 (0.033)	-0.028 (0.039)
Age	0.008 (0.023)	0.005 (0.013)	-0.019 (0.012)
Education	0.053 (0.040)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.019)
Ideology	-.011 (0.014)	0.001 (0.012)	NA
Political Interest	0.005 (0.28)	0.032 (0.020)	NA
Activist	0.046 (0.048)	0.024 (0.034)	0.069 (0.085)

Each coefficient in each column is the result of a separate model
Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 11: Heterogenous Treatment Effects - International Law

	India	Israel
Male	-0.035 (0.046)	0.032 (0.033)
Age	0.022 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.013)
Education	0.011 (0.041)	-0.028 (0.017)
Ideology	-0.016 (0.014)	0.002 (0.012)
Political Interest	-0.038 (0.028)	0.020 (0.020)
Activist	-0.004 (0.048)	0.012 (0.034)

Each coefficient in each column is the result of a separate model
Standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Appendix I: Causal Mediation Results

This Appendix provides results from our causal mediation analysis. For each potential mediator, we estimated a model with the mediator as the dependent variable - linear models for the ordered security, competence, and reputation measures; and logit models for the binary morality and threat variables. For each potential mediator, we also estimated a linear outcome model with approval as the dependent variable. We included the same controls included in the models reported in Appendix F.

Figures 13 and 14 provide the results of mediation models discussed in the paper, i.e., those with one mediator in each outcome model. Figure 15 provides the results of mediation analysis with respect to the opposition violence treatment in which all potential mediators are included in the outcome model. Figure 16 provides the results of mediation analysis with respect to the international law treatment in which all potential mediators are included in the outcome model.

Figure 13: Causal Mediation Results. Opposition Violence Treatment. Single mediator.




Figure 14: Causal Mediation Results. International Law Treatment. Single mediator.




Figure 15: Causal Mediation Results. Opposition Violence Treatment. Multiple Mediators.





Figure 16: Causal Mediation Results. International Law Treatment. Multiple Mediators.



Appendix J: Government Statement Experimental Groups

In this section, we briefly discuss results with respect to the respondents of our surveys who were told that the government issued a statement condemning the opposition. We excluded these from our primary analysis (1) in order to focus on the distinction between violent and non-violent repression; and (2) because the respondents in this group were ineligible for the international law treatment (because the government had not violated international law), so we would not be able to evaluate Hypothesis 3 with respect to this group.

Figure 17 reports the results of tests comparing approval levels among respondents who were told the government issued a statement and those who were told the government responded with (violent or non-violent) repression. Each value represents the first difference in percentage point terms between the groups. In all 3 countries, we find that individuals in the government statement group were more likely to approve of the government. In Argentina, this effect is especially large, which is consistent with our main finding that our Argentine respondents were especially wary of violent government repression.

Figure 17: Change in Government Approval: Government Statement

